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CONSTITUTIONAL OFFICERS

A. Legislative Power To Enlarge upon Constitutional Qualifications
Sections 3 and 4 of article VI of the Constitution of Tennessee
provide that judges shall be elected by the people and prescribe
certain age and residence qualifications. In LaFever v. WareI the
Supreme Court of Tennessee upheld the constitutionality of acts of
the legislature requiring that judges also be licensed to practice law.
A Democratic nominee who was not a licensed attorney was elected
judge of the court of general sessions of White County despite a
provision of the act creating the court that such judge "shall be a
licensed attorney of the State."2 The act also vested in the general
sessions court jurisdiction over divorce cases concurrent with that of
circuit and chancery courts, causing the candidate's election to violate
a similar requirement of recent general legislation setting qualifications
for judges of appellate, criminal, chancery, circuit courts, and other
courts exercising their jurisdiction.3 The entire bar of White County
joined in an action to prevent the elected candidate's assuming the
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.
1. 365 S.W.2d 44 (Tenn. 1963).
2. Tenn. Priv. Acts 1953, ch. 35, § 15.
3. TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-119 (Supp. 1964), enacted in 1961, requires that such
judges be "learned in the law, which must be evidenced by said judge being authorized
to practice law in the courts of Tennessee." This was construed by the court to mean
that the judge be "a licensed attorney of the state," the same requirement as the private
act in question.
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office. The chancellor held the pertinent provisions of the private
act and the general legislation unconstitutional and sustained a
demurrer. In reversing, the supreme court held that the requirement
that a judge be a licensed attorney is a valid exercise of the legislative
power to prescribe reasonable qualifications for holding office in
addition to those prescribed by the constitution.
The question is important and the result is obviously in the interests
of effective judicial administration. The bar is well aware of alarming recent instances of disbarred attorneys or untrained laymen being
elected, or nearly elected, to judicial office in Tennessee. If popular
election of judges must be retained it should at least be coupled with
a limitation of judicial office to members of the bar. The number of
statutes by which the legislature has required that holders of particular
judicial offices be "learned
in the law"4 or "members of the bar"5 or a
"competent lawyer" 6 attests both to the endorsement of this principle
by the representatives of the people and to an assumption by the
legislature that it has constitutional power to protect the people from
such electoral miscarriages. Nonetheless, the holding in LaFever
encountered serious obstacles, both in Tennessee judicial precedent
and in the weight of authority from other jurisdictions.
In Kivett v. Mason,7 the supreme court held unconstitutional a
private act requiring that a county judge be a "practicing attorney"
in an opinion whose reasoning and language was broad enough to
have invalidated the statutory provisions in the present case. The
LaFever opinion distinguishes Kivett as involving an unreasonable
statutory qualification. The requirement that a judge be a practicing
attorney, in contrast to a more general requirement that he merely
be licensed to practice or learned in the law, was viewed as unworkable because of the uncertainty of the term "practicing" and as
arbitrary because it would preclude from judicial office public officials,
law teachers and others who might be equally as competent to be
judges although not engaged in the active practice of law. From this
view of Kivett the court reasoned further that by implication that
case recognized legislative power to prescribe reasonable qualifications.
Although LaFever finds support in two treatises8 and some decisions
4. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 17-112, -115, -204, -221 (1956) (gubernatorial appointees
to vacancies in courts).
5. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 17-214 -215 (1956) (special judges). Cf. TENN. CODE ANN..
§ 17-225 (1956) (since superseded by a new section).
6. TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-202 (1956) (special gubernatorial appointments in event
of incompetency of supreme court judges); TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-222 (1956) (special
judges and cbancellors) (since superseded by a new section).

7. 185 Tenn. 558, 206 S.W.2d 789 (1947).
8. MECHEM, PUimc OFFIcE AND OFFIcERs §§ 64-67 (1890); THRoop, PuBLc OFFIcEns § 82 (1892).
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from other jurisdictions, 9 the weight of authority is that where state
constitutional provisions expressly enumerate qualifications for a

public office, these constitutional qualifications are exclusive and
cannot be enlarged upon by statute.10 This result is generally reached

even though the state's constitution does not expressly direct that
the listed qualifications shall be exclusive, sometimes on the basis of
the maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius,"" finding a constitutional intent of exclusiveness by implication from the express listing
of certain qualifications. This reasoning is close to that of the Tennessee Supreme Court in the Kivett case where it was said:
The language of this section clearly gives the voters the privilege of electing
as judges of these inferior courts whoever they please, so long as the person
they elect is not less than thirty years of age, a resident of the state not less
than five years, and of the circuit or district for which elected not less than
one year. This privilege of the voters can neither be taken away nor
abridged by the legislature, because it is a privilege given these voters by
the Constitution. . . This is an abridgement of this constitutional right
given these voters to elect whomsoever they please as their County Judge,
provided such person meets the age and residential qualifications required
by the Constitution. If the legislature can limit the selection of the voters
to a list composed only of practicing attorneys, then, by the same token,
it can further abridge this constitutional privilege of the voters by limiting
them to an election of one of a list of attorneys who have practiced for
not less than such number of years as the legislature may desire to fix.12

The majority view, as expressed in Kivett, is derived from a narrow

doctrine of constitutional construction which unduly restricts legislative power. It views the constitution itself as the source of legislative
power and requires of every statute an authorization from the constitution. A better approach (where the government is not one of
limited powers like that of the United States) views the people as

the source of all governmental power and holds that the people have
vested in the legislature a total law making power subject only to
positive limitations of the state and federal constitutions. This principle, although overlooked in Kivett, is not novel in Tennessee cases.
Mr. Justice White's opinion in LaFever cited an 1823 opinion of Judge

Haywood in which he stated, "the Legislature of Tennessee, like
the legislatures of all other sovereign states, can do all things not
prohibited by The Constitution of this State or of the United

States ...

."13

More recently the court has phrased the rule: "To be

invalid a statute must be plainly obnoxious to some constitutional
9. Mitchell v. Kinney, 242 Ala. 196, 5 So. 2d 788 (1942); Boughton v. Price, 70
Idaho 243, 215 P.2d 286 (1950); Shub v. Simpson, 196 Md. 177, 76 A.2d 332 (1950);
Glasco v. State Election Bd., 121 Okla. 119, 248 Pac. 642 (1926).
10. See Annot., 34 A.L.R.2d 155 (1952); 3 VAxo. L. Rrv. 811 (1950).
11. "The expression of one thing is the exclusion of another."
12. 185 Tenn. at 564, 206 S.W.2d. at 792.

13. Bell v. Bank of Nashville, 7 Tenn. 269 (1823).
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provision."14 So long as the constitutional qualifications are respected,
statutes adding reasonable qualifications for public office are not
"plainly obnoxious."
Although the court found a basis to distinguish Kivett and it may
still be good law, the LaFever opinion can be viewed as a return to
fundamentals in its view of legislative power. Tennessee judges must
still have those qualifications specified by the constitution but the
legislature may view these as minimal and add such additional qualifications as it reasonably deems the public interest to require. This
could foreshadow further statutory improvements in judicial
machinery now that legislative power in the premises is firmly established. Statutory requirements of judicial qualifications which might
have seemed unreasonable in the past may take on new light in view
of the increasing complexity of modem litigation and the strains upon
the court system.
B. Divestment of Duties by MetropolitanCharter
In Winter v. Allen,15 the supreme court held that Nashville's Metropolitan Charter superseded general statutory law by transferring to
the Metropolitan Tax Assessor certain statutory functions of the
County Court Clerk for Davidson County. Although the County
Court Clerk is a constitutional officer, his duties and functions are left
to be prescribed by statute. The Winter opinion recognizes that the
charter is a valid exercise of delegated legislative power by holding
that its provisions prevail over prior law "of equal dignity" in the
same way that a statute repeals prior conflicting enactments by
implication. This analysis also clarifies the subordinate position of
the charter to the state constitution. The court's reasoning in the
1962 case upholding the charter 6 had left the way open for argument
that the terms of the charter might prevail over express constitutional
provisions. 17 This could have had far reaching consequences and
would have permitted total abolition of constitutional offices by
Metropolitan Charter. Equating the charter to a statutory enactment
removes any doubt that the charter is equally subject to constitutional
limitations.

II. Dut

PnocEss

OF LAw

A. Statutory Prohibitionof Purchasesby Pawnbrokers
In Epstein v. State,'8 a pawnbroker had been convicted of violating
14. Frazer v. Carr, 210 Tenn. 565, 585, 360 S.W.2d 449, 457, (1962);

Chattanooga v. Fanburg, 196 Tenn. 226, 235, 265 S.W.2d 15, 20 (1954).
15. 367 S.W.2d 785 (Tenn. 1963).
16. Frazer v. Carr, supra note 14.
17. See Kirby, Constitutional Law-1962 Tennessee Survey, 16 VAs-D. L.
650-51 (1963).
18. 366 S.W.2d 914 (1963).

City of

REv.
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a statute which provides that "no pawn broker.., shall, in the conduct
of said business, under any pretense whatever, purchase or buy any
personal property whatsoever." 19 Although he was acquitted of
related charges of larceny and receiving stolen goods, he was convicted of this offense on proof of a transaction in which he paid out
a large sum of money and received stolen firearms which he soon
thereafter offered for sale in a mercantile business conducted on the
20
same premises.
The statute was challenged as a denial of due process of law because its terms prohibit all purchases of personal property in the
conduct of a pawnbroking business and literally would forbid the
buying of supplies and equipment necessary for its operation. The
court construed the statute so as to avoid such an absurd and
obviously unconstitutional application by limiting it to purchases
made by the pawnbroker "in the business of pawnbroking," that is,
to purchases from "those who come in to pawn their property." As
thus construed, the statute was readily upheld.
Pawnbroking's obvious potential for the aid of crime through
purchases of stolen goods makes the business particularly susceptible
to police power regulation by the state. Also, forbidding pawnbrokers
from purchasing from prospective borrowers removes an opportunity
for exploitation of distressed persons who need money. The pawnbroker can only loan on the security of the pawned goods at rates
regulated by law; he cannot refuse a loan in order to induce the
customer to sell at a low price.
Although one substantive due process objection was avoided by
giving the statute this narrow application, it suggests other problems.
Conviction of this defendant did not require that the jury be instructed on the subtle differences between lawful loans secured by
pawns and unlawful purchases by pawnbrokers in similar circumstances. The difference is frequently only formal, since often the
borrower has no intention to redeem the pawned goods. The court
indicated that a purpose of the legislature may have been to keep the
pawnbroker from buying personal property in a transaction which
"purports to be a pledge." Difficulties may arise if a criminal conviction is ever based upon findings that an apparent pledge was only
"purported" and actually amounted to a purchase. If a transaction
actually takes the form, and carries the incidental attributes, of a
lawful pledge, and the borrower had a right to redeem the goods
upon repayment of the cash advance according to its terms, could
19. TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-2216 (1956).
20. A provision of the law which prohibited pawnbrokers from carrying on any other
business in the same or an adjoining building was repealed in 1949.
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criminal liability result from an intention of one or both parties that
the right of redemption would not be exercised?
In the Epstein case the defendant apparently contended that the
transaction was not a pawn and claimed that it was a purchase from
a trader in guns for purposes of resale in a mercantile business. This
obviously was not believed by the jury and it made the nature of
the seller, rather than the nature of the transaction, a determinative
issue. The report of the case leaves considerable doubt that the jury
was adequately instructed on this aspect of the law or the meaning of
the statute as the supreme court later interpreted it on appeal. The
net effect is that pawnbrokers who also are retailers act at their peril
unless they purchase for resale only from regular dealers and deal
in pawns only with individual members of the general public. These
may be legitimate restrictions but they do not readily appear from
the terms of the statute. This suggests that the statute as construed,
may be unconstitutionally vague and uncertain, an issue not considered by the court.
LAws
III. EQUAL PROTCrION OF T
Racial discrimination continued to be the subject of much constitutional litigation in federal courts in Tennessee. The public schools
of the major metropolitan areas, recreational facilities of the City of
Memphis, and a privately owned and operated motel in Nashville
were objects of federal court decisions requiring desegregation. Legislative apportionment also continued to be a source of equal protection
claims.

A. Racial Discriminationby Private Motel in Urban Renewal Project
A far-reaching decision was reached by the Federal District Court
for the Middle District of Tennessee in Smith v. Holiday Inns of
America, Inc.21 The defendant corporation owns and operates a motel
in the Capitol Hill Redevelopment Project in Nashville on land which
it purchased by warranty deed from the Nashville Housing Authority.
Plaintiff was denied accommodations at the motel pursuant to an
admitted policy against serving Negroes and brought a class action
under Federal Civil Rights Acts for declaratory relief and an injunction against racial discrimination. The court held that extensive
participation by state agencies in the development of defendant's
property and continuing governmental controls over its future use
caused its operation to be "state action" within the meaning of the
fourteenth amendment and thus prevented it from discriminating on
account of race. The case was held to be within the rule of Burton v.
21. 220 F. Supp. 1 (M.D. Tenn. 1963).

950
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Wilmington Parking Authority,22 in which the United States Supreme
Court held that a restaurant privately operated under lease from a
city in connection with a city-owned parking area was involved with
the state "to a significant extent" so that otherwise private action was
subject to the fourteenth amendment.
The Capitol Hill Redevelopment Project originated in studies made
by the Nashville Housing Authority and the Nashville Planning Commission for which the Federal Housing and Home Finance Agency
ultimately provided the funds. These studies resulted in approval by
the city of a comprehensive redevelopment plan for the purpose of
eliminating slums and blighted areas around the Tennessee State
Capitol. The city, the Housing Authority, and the Housing and Home
Finance Agency then entered into agreements under which the
requisite financing was provided pursuant to the Federal Housing Act
of 1949. The Housing Authority acquired the necessary land by
purchase or condemnation, relocated displaced residents, landscaped,
constructed streets, installed utilities and sold lots to private owners,
all pursuant to the comprehensive overall development plan. The total
cost was projected to be about twelve million dollars, of which only
four million would be recaptured by sales of land to private owners,
leaving a net project cost of eight million dollars, two-thirds of which
is to be paid from Federal grants and one-third by the Housing
Authority and City of Nashville.
The contract under which the defendant purchased its land obligated it to construct a motel in accordance with agreed plans and
specifications. The warranty deed was subject to restrictive covenants
which were found by the court to burden the private owner with
such governmental restrictions and controls that "not even the slightest
change" in the use of the property or physical alterations or improvements "of any lind" could be made without prior approval of a
public agency. Indicating that it would be a different issue if the
only governmental involvement were prior ownership and development of the property, the court held that the deeds, contracts of
sale, and recorded restrictions reserved substantial governmental control over the present and future use of the property in pursuance of
public purposes served by the Nashville Housing Authority. The fact
that such controls were accomplished with a sale rather than a lease,
as in the Burton case, was held to be immaterial because "the crucial
test of State action is the actuality of State involvement, rather than
the form of the transaction." Plaintiff was held entitled to a permanent injunction enjoining defendants from denying accommodations to Negroes on the same terms and conditions as they are
22. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
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furnished to white persons. The case is on appeal to the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals, which will doubtless dispose of it during the next
survey period.
The Holiday Inns decision is part of a discernible trend under the
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority rule towards holding otherwise private action to be subject to the fourteenth amendment because
of governmental aid and involvement. The denial of certiorari by
the U.S. Supreme Court in a case holding private hospitals receiving
federal Hill-Burton funds to be subject to the fourteenth amendment23
indicates that it is not yet ready to define the outer limits of the
Burton doctrine and is awaiting further experience in the lower federal
courts in applying the doctrine to varying factual situations before
laying down further guidelines. The Burton opinion stated that "only
by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its true
significance." 24 This indicates a deference to determinations by trial
courts which could afford a wide latitude to their assessment of the
"significance" of state involvement in particular cases. This may
foreshadow a long period of uncertainty as to the public or private
status of many activities as government increasingly becomes more
involved with them.
B. Racial Segregationin Public RecreationalFacilities
In Watson v. City of Memphis,25 the United States Supreme Court
reversed a decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals which
had approved a plan for gradual desegregation of Memphis parks and
recreational facilities. The Sixth Circuit had reasoned that the same
"deliberate speed" standard for school desegregation should also be
applicable to these facilities. The Supreme Court disagreed and
ordered immediate total desegregation.
Passage of time since the 1954 school cases and absence of similar
administrative considerations were held to distinguish the situations
and to require that gradual desegregation not be permitted. The
Negroes' right to be free of racial discrimination in governmental
facilities was said to be a "present right" rather than "a mere hope
of some future enjoyment" and the second Brown decision 26 per23. Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964). The same court has since held that a private hospital
which was not in the Hill-Burton program was also subject to the fourteenth amendment
because of various other governmental involvements, particularly a reverter clause in a
deed from the city which required that the property be operated as a hospital. Eaton
v. Grubbs, 329 F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1964).
24. 365 U.S. at 722.
25. 373 U.S. 526 (1963).
26. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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mitting deliberate speed was described as a "narrowly drawn and
carefully limited, qualification upon usual precepts of constitutional
adjudication." 27 In addition to distinguishing public recreational

facilities from public schools with respect to inherent administrative
difficulties of desegregation, the Court also indicated that programs
for school desegregation which would have been sufficient earlier
might no longer satisfy the "all deliberate speed" test of Brown. Indefinite delay in eliminating racial barriers was never contemplated
and the fact that the governing principles are no longer new is now
to be considered in determining the appropriateness of equitable protection of constitutional rights.

A contention by the city that total and immediate desegregation
of these facilities would cause widespread violence was viewed as
speculative but was held immaterial because constitutional rights may
not be denied merely because of hostility to their exercise. A claim
of need for additional supervision in integrated facilities and time
in order to prepare for additional expense was also rejected. No
collateral considerations were deemed sufficient to justify exception
to total and immediate relief. The district court had abstained from
ruling on desegregation of an art museum pending initiation of a
suit in a state court to construe a racially restrictive covenant in the
deed of the property to the city. This was held to be error because
the outcome of such litigation was immaterial to the invalidity of
segregation enforced by the city. Even if desegregation were to
cause a reversion of title to the museum property, this could not affect
the city's constitutional duty.28
C. Racial Segregationin Public Schools
In 1962 the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
reaffirmed its prior decision upholding transfer provisions of the socalled "Nashville Plan"29 and approved similar provisions in plans for
desegregation of schools of Davidson County 30 and Knoxville. 31 In
Goss v. Board of Education,32 the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously
reversed in an opinion issued for both cases.
The transfer provisions in question permitted voluntary transfer
by students when: (1) a white student would otherwise be required
27. 373 U.S. at 533.
28. However, the court noted that there was little reason to believe the restriction
would be enforced because the museum had been open to Negroes one day a week
without complaint.
29. Kelly v. Board of Educ., 270 F.2d 209 (6th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 924
(1959).
30. Maxwell v. Board of Educ., 301 F.2d 828 (6th Cir. 1962).
31. Goss v. Board of Educ., 301 F.2d 164 (6th Cir. 1962).
32. 373 U.S. 683 (1963).
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to attend a school previously attended solely by colored students; (2)
a colored student would otherwise be required to attend a school
previously attended only by white students; or (3) when any student
would otherwise be required to attend a school in which his race was
in the minority.
Recognition of race as a criteria for transfer was alone sufficient to
invalidate the provisions as racial classifications by law, but the
Court also relied upon the necessary tendency of the provisions to
perpetuate segregation. Mr. Justice Clark described the right to
transfer as a "one-way ticket leading to but one destination, i.e., the
majority race of the transferee and continued segregation." 33 The fact
that each race was equally able to transfer from a desegregated to
a segregated school, was viewed as only "superficial" equality and it
was held to be racially discriminatory because it allowed a student to
transfer as of right to a school in which his race is in the majority
but not to one where it is a minority.
Desegregation of the Chattanooga public schools passed through
another phase with the decision of the federal court of appeals in
Mapp v. Board of Education.34 Defendants had appealed from the
district court's disapproval of a proposed provision in their plan for
gradual desegregation which would have required parents to file a
"notice of intent" before enrolling a child in a desegregated school
other than the school he previously attended. 35 The court of appeals
agreed that the provision unlawfully made student application and
consent a prerequisite to implementation of desegregation. The board
was also unsuccessful in its appeal from disapproval of transfer
provisions. Because of their tendency to promote segregation, the
district court had disapproved "Nashville plan" transfer provisions
similar to those later held unconstitutional by the United States
Supreme Court in the Goss case. The Goss decision had intervened
when the court of appeals decided Mapp and it readily affirmed the
district court in this respect. Goss was construed as holding that trial
judges have no discretion to approve transfer provisions based on
race.
Plaintiffs' appeal from portions of the district court's judgment
unfavorable to them were more successful. The district court had
stricken from the complaint allegations of discriminatory assignment
of principals, teachers, and administrative personnel on the grounds
that since such personnel were not members of the class represented
33. Id. at 687.
34. 319 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1963).
35. Details of the Chattanooga desegregation plan are set forth in the opinion of the
district court at 203 F. Supp. 843 (E.D. 1962), which is discussed in Kirby, Constitutional Law-1962 Tennessee Survey, 16 VAND. L. REv. 649, 673 (1963).
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by plaintiffs, they could not raise an issue concerning their rights.
The court of appeals construed the complaint as asserting a claim
that discriminatory assignment of such personnel on a racial basis
impaired the students' rights to education free of racial considerations.
Noting that neither the Supreme Court nor any court of appeals had
considered such a claim, 36 the court expressly declined to indicate
any opinion upon the merits but ordered the allegations restored to
the complaint for disposition after developments in progress of pupil
desegregation. The court also disapproved delay in desegregation of
high school vocational and technical classes in Chattanooga finding
differences in such opportunities for Negroes and white students
which would have violated the old "separate but equal" test. Certain
types of technical training would be totally unavailable to Negro
children now in the school system if it were desegregated at the same
gradual rate as other high school classes. Without being more specific,
the court ordered that the district court require the board to study
the problem and submit a plan which would permit Negro students
to take vocational training courses for which they were otherwise
qualified.
Desegregation of the public schools of both the City of Jackson
and Madison County, Tennessee was accomplished in a single action
in Monroe v. Board of Commissioners.37 The United States District
Court for the Western District of Tennessee granted summary judgment against both boards of education and ordered both to submit
plans for desegregation. In ruling upon the city's plan the court
accelerated the proposed gradual desegregation to require complete
desegregation in four years. The approved plan provided for a single
set of non-racial geographical attendance zones with a right in any
pupil to continue to attend the school in which he was previously
enrolled although he now lives outside that schoors zone. Broad transfer provisions were approved subject to express conditions that no
admission or transfer may be based on race or have as its purpose
the delay of desegregation and that pupils residing in a zone have a
prior right to attend its school over outside students seeking to transfer to it.
After school opened in September 1963, plaintiffs moved for further
relief, alleging that the Jackson Board was not applying the plan in
accordance with the court's order. The court rejected a claim that the
Board had "gerrymandered" the lines of the unitary school zones to
36. The Fifth Circuit has since held that a district court may enjoin discriminatory
assignment of teachers and administrative personnel in a desegregation action brought
by pupils. Board of Public Instruction v. Braxton, 326 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1964).
37. 221 F. Supp. 968 (W.D. Tenn. 1963).
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perpetuate segregation and held that such de facto segregation as
continued was due to residential patterns. The court held that only
compulsory segregation based on race is forbidden and school officials
are under no affirmative duty to accomplish integration of the races
by zoning schools or assigning pupils with a view to avoiding de facto
segregation caused by residential segregation. School officials were
accorded "considerable discretion" in zoning which is to be overridden
only for clear abuse.
D. Legislative Apportionment
Further developments in the proceedings upon remand of Baker v.
Cart38 failed to bring it to a conclusion. The second legislative
reapportionment39 enacted by the Tennessee General Assembly since
the Supreme Court's decision was also found to be unconstitutional.
In 1962 the three-judge court had passed on an apportionment made
by an extraordinary session of the General Assembly which was convened solely for that purpose in response to the Baker v. Carr
decision and a temporary abstention by the district court upon
remand. The district court then limited itself to an "expression of
views" that the equal protection clause required that representation in
one house of a bicameral legislature be based exclusively on population and that the other have some rational basis but that the 1962
apportionment failed to meet these standards. Shortcomings of the
1962 acts were discussed in detail to furnish guidelines for the regular
1963 legislature which was elected under the somewhat improved
40
apportionment.
The 1963 apportionment of the House of Representatives was held
to be a satisfactory apportionment on a rational basis other than
population but the Senate apportionment was based only partially,
not exclusively, on population and therefore caused the entire apportionment to fail to meet the court's tests. The 33 Senatorial districts
varied from 50,645 to 80,978 in population and urban voters had been
discriminated against by a formula which disregarded fractions of the
number of persons entitled to one Senator in the five urban counties
whose populations were greater than this number. This released
three senate seats from urban to rural counties and correspondingly
caused overrepresentation of rural districts. The Senate Committee
which recommended the scheme justified it on the grounds that the
provision of the Tennessee Constitution which makes the county an
38. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
39. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 3-101 to -107 (Supp. 1963).
40. The 1962 action of the district court is reported at 206 F. Supp. 341 (W.D. Tenn.
1962), and was discussed at length in Kirby, Constitutional Law-1962 Tennessee Survey, 16 VND. L. R v. 646, 664 (1963).
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unbreakable unit in selection of senators 4' compels either that a
metropolitan county be underrepresented to the extent of its fraction
or that it be placed in a district with an adjoining smaller county
which would result in overrepresentation because of larger counties'
historical dominance of the election of "shared" senators. This is a
rational basis for departure from exclusive numerical representation
and would have been a lawful consideration for apportionment of one
house but it injected into the Senate the same concept of area or
small county representation which was the basis of the House of
Representatives apportionment. The result was that neither house
was apportioned exclusively on population.
The court would have accepted the Senate plan if reasonably
accurate apportionment could only be accomplished by disregard of
urban fractions but a plan was proposed by plaintiffs which split no
county and which varied population per senator only from 59,042 to
71,490. This plan's sole defect, an inequity to Anderson County from
placing it with Knox County in a single district, was remedied by
modifying the plan to also place Anderson in two other districts
proposed for Knox alone. The court could see no valid reason to give
the Tennessee legislature another opportunity and indicated that it
was ready to place this plan in effect by judicial decree. Recognizing
that the plan might yet be further improved, the court gave defendants until February 3, 1964 to file objections or alternative plans.42
E. Apportionment of ConstitutionalConvention Delegates

In a related case, West v. Carr,43 the Tennessee Supreme Court
cleared the way for a convention to propose amendments to the
Tennessee Constitution concerning the legislature, including those on
apportionment, even though representation in the convention is to
be based on the 1901 apportionment of the House of Representatives.
The 1962 extra session which enacted the first reapportionment following Baker v. Carr also passed an act 4 submitting to a vote of the
people the question of calling such a convention. It received the
requisite state wide voter approval in the November 1962 general
election. Delegates were elected in the August 1964 election and
the convention will convene in July 1965. Discrimination against
urban voters and taxpayers in the composition of the convention was
41. TENN. CONST. art. II, § 6. This belated concern for Tennessee Constitutional provisions, which require representation in both houses on the basis of population, overlooked the fact that fractions lost by counties in the house apportionment are required
by this same section to be "made up" to them in the senate apportionment.
42. In an unreported order the court deferred final action until decision by the United
States Supreme Court in several apportionment cases pending before it.

43. 370 S.W.2d 469 (Tenn. 1963).
44. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1962, ch. 2.
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held not to be a basis for declaration of unconstitutionality of the
1962 enactment or an injunction against the 1964 election of dele45

gates .

The first ground of the court's holding was that Baker v. Carr is
distinguishable because, unlike the 1901 apportionment legislation,
the 1962 act of the legislature initiating the amending process was
not an exercise of legislative authority. This is a doubtful basis for
application of a different substantive principle from that of Baker v.
Carr. The role of a legislative body in the amending process has
been distinguished from its role in the legislative process for other
purposes, 46 but both functions should be regarded as "state action"
within the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 47 If
the Tennessee legislature had provided that only white persons could
be elected to the 1965 convention the unconstitutionality would be
clear. It should be no different when the equal protection claim is
based on invidious discrimination against urban voters.
Another ground of the holding was that approval of the call of the
convention by a majority of the voters in the 1962 election, at which
there was no malapportionment or debasement of individual votes,
made the entire 1962 act, including the manner of choosing delegates,
the act of the people. The implicit suggestion that majority approval
validates discriminatory state action otherwise invalid under the
fourteenth amendment goes against the basic premise of constitutional
rights. Continuing the previous analogy, the electorate could not
have conferred constitutionality upon a convention limited to delegates of the white race.
In a context with popular referendum, an equal protection claim
based on rural minority oppression of urban majorities is somewhat
45. The appeal was from an order of the chancellor holding the 1962 act unconstitutional but declining to enjoin the November 1962 election on the question of holding
the convention. The complaint had sought to enjoin all the elections called for by the
1962 act but the appeal was not heard and decided in the supreme court until after the
favorable vote in the 1962 election. The chancellor's decree was reversed and the bill of
complaint dismissed.
46. The action of the United States Congress in proposing a constitutional amendment is non-legislative and need not be approved by the President. Hollingsworth v.
Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798). The action of a state legislature in ratifying an
amendment submitted to the states by Congress is the means of "the expression of the
assent of the state" and is not legislative action subject to limitation by state constitutional provisions. Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922); Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221
(1920).
47. In submitting the question of calling a convention the legislature is directed to
act "by law." TNiq. CONST. art. III, § 3, par. 2. See note 48 infra. This indicates that
its action, if not legislative in the ordinary sense, is nonetheless subject to constitutional
limitations on the legislative process and that it is not a grant of a special power to the
legislative body as an agency. Cf. Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932); Carroll v.
Becker, 329 Mo. 501, 45 S.W.2d 533 (1932), aff'd, 285 U.S. 380 (1932); Koenig v.
Flynn, 258 N.Y. 292, 179 N.E. 705 (1932), aff'd, 285 U.S. 375 (1932).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 17

more difficult to evaluate. A minority of urban voters may have joined
with rural voters in an effort to perpetuate rural overrepresentation.
At the most this is a sort of waiver by this urban minority which
should not affect the rights of a majority of urban voters to be
represented in lawmaking bodies according to their numbers.
The court emphasized the tentative functions in the amending
process of the legislature and the convention and the fact that the
constitution can finally be amended only by action of the people.4 8
Although popular elections are both final and intermediate steps in
the amending process, affirmative action of the convention is equally
essential. The fact that urban voters are allowed their constitutional
rights at one essential stage of the multi-step amending process
should not cure denial of such rights at another. In Baker v. Carr, the
opinions of Justices Brennan and Clark both emphasized the control
of the malapportioned Tennessee legislature over the call of constitutional conventions as one element in the legal frustration of Tennessee
voters which justified federal judicial intervention. 49 At the most, a
majority of the voters can veto constitutional changes by voting
against convention calls and proposed amendments. While they are
underrepresented in either the legislature or the convention, they lack
power affirmatively to shape constitutional change. As a representative body whose affirmative action is essential to a modification of
the state's organic law, the convention is vested with a portion of
the sovereign powers granted by the people through the constitution.
Its power is of a higher order than that of the legislature and discrimination in representation should be no more lawful.
A procedural ground of the holding was that there was no right
to declaratory relief because of the absence of a justiciable controversy until the amending process is concluded. If this means
that denial of rights to representation in the convention will be con48. Section 3 of article 11 of the Tennessee Constitution provides two modes of
amendment: (1) by an amendment proposed by two successive Legislatures and ratified by a vote of the people; and (2) by an act of the legislature providing for a convention, and its submission of proposals to the people as follows: "The Legislature shall
have the right by law to submit to the people, at any general election, the question of
calling a convention to alter, reform, or abolish this Constitution, or to alter, reform or
abolish any specified part or parts of it; and when, upon such submission, a majority of
all the voters voting upon the proposal submitted shall approve the proposal to call a
convention, the delegates to such convention shall be chosen at the next general election and the convention shall assemble for the consideration of such proposals as shall
have received a favorable vote in said election, in such mode and manner as shall be
prescribed. No change in, or amendment to, this Constitution proposed by such convention shall become effective, unless within the limitations of the call of the convention, and unless approved and ratified by a majority of the qualified voters voting
separately on such change or amendment at an election to be held in such manner and
on such dates as may be fixed by the convention."
49. 369 U.S. at 193, 259.
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sidered only upon a challenge of any amendment which is adopted,
the court's holding goes only to timeliness of the action. However, it
may rest on a mistaken view that protection of voter rights under the
principle of Baker v. Carr depends on the results which come from
malapportioned representative bodies. That opinion did not base
relief to underrepresented urban voters upon specific injury from
legislative products of malapportioned bodies, but relied instead upon
their right to vote in the election of legislators free of dilution by
arbitrary state action. Their injury was described as legislative
classification which "disfavors the voters in the counties in which they
reside, placing them in a position of constitutionally unjustifiable
inequality vis-a-vis voters in irrationally favored counties." 50 If Baker
v. Carr is applicable to malapportionment of a constitutional convention, as suggested by the foregoing analysis, the legal injury to
Tennessee urban voters' voting rights will occur when they vote for
convention delegates under an invidiously discriminatory allocation.
If election of legislators under an invalid apportionment can be enjoined despite uncertainty as to the laws which they might later
enact, election of delegates to a constitutional convention should also
be enjoinable despite similar uncertainty as to the amendments they
might propose.
IV. MISCELLANEOUS
A. Standing of Criminal Defendant To Challenge
Statute Fixing County Boundary
In State v. Hoffman,51 the defendant had been convicted in the
General Sessions Court of Lake County for unlawfully selling game
fish on Reelfoot Lake. On appeal to the Circuit Court of Lake County,
he contended that its courts lacked jurisdiction on the grounds that
the offense was committed in Obion County. As an exception to general requirements for size of new counties, the Constitution of 1870
had authorized creation of Lake County from that portion of Obion
County lying west of the low water mark of Reelfoot Lake. 52 If the
constitution had been observed, an offense on the waters of Reelfoot
Lake would necessarily have been committed in Obion County
rather than Lake, but 1893 and 1897 acts of the legislature had fixed
the boundary within the lake. The circuit court held these acts
53
unconstitutional.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Tennessee reversed, holding that
50. 369 U.S. at 207-08.
51. 362 S.W.2d 231 (Tenn. 1962).
52. TENN. CONST. art. XY,§ 4.
53. Nonetheless, the court held that it had jurisdiction under TaNN. CODE ANN. §
5-102 (1956), which gives counties concurrent jurisdiction over waters lying between
them.
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long acquiescence by public officials and citizens of both counties in
recognition of the challenged boundary and Lake County's actual
exercise of jurisdiction over the territory in question meant that defendant was actually tried in the county where the misdemeanor
was committed. Under these circumstances the defendant was held
to lack standing to challenge constitutionality of the statutes fixing
the boundary. 4
B. Alteration of County Officers' Salary During Term; Elision of
UnconstitutionalDate and Substitutionof EarliestValid Date
In State ex rel. Ross v. Fleming,5 5 a private act increasing the salary
of a county attorney was clearly unconstitutional because it violated
the 1953 Home Rule amendment to the Tennessee Constitution which
prohibits the state legislature from passing laws altering the salary of
a public officer prior to the end of his term.5 6 An incumbent whose
term had expired began a new term on April 10, 1961. He then
claimed the right to a salary increase which a private act had provided
effective February 1, 1959, a date within his previous term. The
trial court ruled in his favor by eliding the date "February 1, 1959"
from the act and substituting the date, "April 10, 1961" in order to
give effect to a presumed legislative intent to award the incumbent
county attorney an increase in pay at the earliest valid date. The
supreme court affirmed.
The doctrine of elision is usually applied to enable enforcement of
valid provisions of a statute which are left after separable invalid provisions are stricken 57 and then it is sometimes said to be applied with
"hesitation." 8 Substitution of new statutory language by a court is
more unusual although in a proper case a court will read in language
omitted by the legislature in order to give effect to an actual, but imperfectly expressed, legislative intent. 59 The combination of these two
unrelated rules of construction to produce a new doctrine of "elision
54. Accord, State v. Rich, 20 Mo. 393 (1855); Speck v. State, 66 Tenn. 46 (1872).
In these cases the rule is stated that where the statute establishing the county is not
invalid on its face, it may not be attacked collaterally by a defendant in a criminal
proceeding but may be challenged only in direct proceedings between the counties.
55. 364 S.W.2d (Tenn. 1963).
56. TrEr.CONST. art. XI, § 9, par. 2.
57. Davidson County v. Elrod, 191 Tenn. 109, 232 S.W.2d 1 (1950); Edward v.
Davis, 146 Tenn. 615, 244 S.W. 359 (1922). There remains a complete law which the
legislature would have intended to become effective without the stricken provision. The
absence of a separability clause has been held to create a presumption that the legislature did not intend the act to become effective without all its provisions. Life and Cas.
Ins. Co. v. MeCormack, 174 Tenn. 327, 125 S.W.2d 151 (1939). But see Perritt v.
Carter, 203 Tenn. 26, 308 S.W.2d 482 (1957).
58. Mensi v. Walker, 160 Tenn. 468, 475, 26 S.W.2d 132, 135 (1930).
59. Southern Ry. v. Rowland, 152 Tenn. 243, 276 S.W. 638 (1925); Ashby v. State,
124 Tenn. 684, 139 S.W. 872 (1911).
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and substitution" appears to make the court a co-worker in the legislative process, amending legislation by striking bad words and inserting good ones to produce a different provision which is presumably
the legislature's second choice.
The holding of the Fleming case is in accord with Bayless v. Knox
County,60 in which the court considered a similar law which violated
the corresponding constitutional provision concerning judges. 61 However, in Bayless the court reached the same result merely by eliding
the invalid date and holding the salary increase to be effective at the
beginning of the next term of office without the formality of inserting
the new date in the statute.
The purpose of these constitutional provisions is to protect the independence of public officials in the discharge of their duties. 62 The
framers of the constitution apparently thought increases and reductions in compensation during terms of office equally were threats to
this desired independence. 63 Presumably the liberal rules of the
Fleming and Bayless cases would also be applied to give prospective
effect to legislation which attempted to diminish the salary of an officer
during a term. The net effect could be to render these constitutional
prohibitions virtually ineffective. The legislature can freely enact
intra-term salary alterations, secure in an assumption that if it is corrected by the courts, the salary increase or decrease will take effect at
the earliest lawful date which could have been specified. This renders
it less likely that unlawful salary increases will be challenged by local
fiscal officers. Few county judges can be expected to engage in unpopular litigation for the slight degree of fiscal relief afforded in the
Fleming case. The court ruled in Bayless that increases paid unlawfully during the initial term could not be recovered for the county
in a taxpayers suit. These constitutional provisions may well have become largely directory to the legislature without effective judicial
sanctions.
60. 199 Tenn. 268, 286 S.W.2d 579 (1955).
61. TEr. CONST. art. VI,

§

7. Similar provisions apply to the governor (art. III, § 7)

and to members of the legislature (art. II, § 22). All forbid either increase or decrease
in compensation during a term of office.
62. State ex rel. Webb v. Brown, 132 Tenn. 685, 179 S.W. 321 (1915).
63. The framers of the United States Constitution chose to guard the independence
of federal judges only against diminishment of compensation, U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2,
par. 1, but the President's compensation may neither be increased nor diminished. U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 1, par. 7. Senators or Representatives are only prohibited from being
appointed to any federal office whose emoluments were increased during their terms.
U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 6, par. 2.

